

**MEMORANDUM FOR:** Special Assistant to the President  
for National Security Affairs

**SUBJECT:** Security Handling of Satellite  
Reconnaissance Products

NSA review  
completed

1. This memorandum is responding to your oral request for advice on whether the Presidential Directive of August 26, 1960, which establishes the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System for the protection of the products of satellite reconnaissance, should include products other than photographic. It was understood that this question recognized that the products of SAMOS have already been excepted from the Presidential Directive.

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
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**4. Some who consider this question might come to the conclusion that no special protective measures are required because the USSR can readily assume that the United States is at least exploring the use of electronic collection in satellites since electronic systems are known to them and are a part of the control of the satellite. In this same vein some may conclude that the USSR can presume, on the basis of its findings from the downed U-2 of 1 May 1960 that our satellite capsule**

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recoveries must be photographic in nature. Whatever one considers to be the Russian estimates of our satellite reconnaissance capabilities, the United States has not admitted any such reconnaissance and has in fact prepared and uses cover stories to protect what it is in fact doing. Furthermore, as far as we know, there has been no violation of security by which the Russians have had confirmed either the fact of our reconnaissance or its scope and quality.

5. In particular, the analysis of ELINT and in the future COMINT and the application of both to COMINT production does and will require the participation of a much larger number of personnel within NSA than has thus far been essential in the application of satellite reconnaissance photography to NSA's mission and function. To bring these products into T-KH would greatly expand the number of those who might perhaps learn of the fact of satellite photography, but who would not require such knowledge. This would not be true of other agencies. If the sensitivity of clandestine satellite reconnaissance (ELINT and COMINT) remains as outlined in paragraphs 1 and 2, then even within NSA some compartment will have to be established to embrace the large number of people who it appears are required for exploitation and fusion. This compart-

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ment administered by NSA within itself must provide controls which ensures that only those designated will become aware of satellites as the source.

6. The publication of information derived from NSA's exploitation which reveals the satellite as a source, will require some practicable arrangement to provide exclusive handling within consumer agencies. This arrangement already exists in the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security Control System. At the point of publication the information should enter that system. This will avoid the introduction into the Community of still another security system and will take advantage of well established procedures.

**7. Conclusion:**

a. That the Presidential Directive of August 26, 1960 should apply for the protection of the materials and information derived from clandestine satellite collection operations;

b. That special security arrangements may be required in the initial phase in the exploitation of certain of the materials as is currently required for ELINT and COMINT exploitation as outlined in c, blow;

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c. That NSA should proceed to establish a special compartment for exploitation, applicable only within NSA which must ensure that the fact of derivation of the ELINT or COMINT should be known only to those authorized on a "must know" basis; the intelligence information produced by NSA analysis will be published in and controlled by the T-KH system which shall govern all relations between other U. S. agencies and NSA in this regard, subject to the additional controls of COMINT when in fact the information is COMINT but not ELINT.


8. Recommendations:

- a. That the conclusions in paragraph 7 above be approved.
- b. That the Presidential Directive of August 26, 1960 be revised to read as follows (insertions underlined):

I hereby direct that all of the products of clandestine satellite reconnaissance and information of the fact of such reconnaissance revealed by the product, shall be given strict security handling

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**under the provisions of a special security  
control system approved by me. I hereby  
approve the TALENT-KEYHOLE Security  
Control System for this purpose. It shall  
not however apply to the products of the  
SAMOS Project which is overt.**

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